The situation, in which an enormous risk is insured by a number of insurance companies, is modeled through a cooperative TU game, the so-called coinsurance game, first introduced in Fragnelli and Marina (2004) . In this paper we show that a co-insurance game possesses several interesting properties that allow to study the nonemptiness and the structure of the core and to construct an efficient algorithm for computing the nucleolus.
Introduction
In many practical situations the risks are too large to be insured by only one company, for example environmental pollution risk. As a result, several insurance companies share the liability and premium. In such a risk sharing situation two important practical questions arise: which premium the insurance companies have to charge and how should the companies split the risk and the premium keeping themselves as much competitive as possible and at the same time obtaining a fair division? In Fragnelli and Marina [8] the problem is approached from a game theoretic point of view through the construction of a cooperative game, the so-called co-insurance game. In this paper we study the nonemptiness and the structure of the core and the nucleolus of the co-insurance game subject to the premium value. If the premium is large enough, the core is empty. If the premium meets a critical upper bound, the nonemptiness of the core, being a single allocation composed of player's marginal contributions, turns out to be equivalent to the so-called 1-convexity property of the co-insurance game. Moreover, if nonemptiness applies, the co-insurance game inherits the 1-convexity property while lowering the premium till a critical lower bound induced by the individual evaluations of the enormous risk. In addition, 1-convexity of the co-insurance game yields the linearity of the nucleolus which, in particular, appears to be a linear function of the variable premium. If 1-convexity does not apply, then for the premium below another critical number we present an efficient algorithm for computing the nucleolus.
The interest to the class of co-insurance games is not only because they reflect the well defined actual economic situations but also it is determined by the fact that any arbitrary nonnegative monotonic cooperative game may be represented in the form of a co-insurance game. This allows to glance into the nature of a nonnegative monotonic game from another angle and by that to discover its new properties and peculiarities. Further, a co-insurance game appears to be a very natural extension of the well-known bankruptcy game introduced by Aumann and Maschler [2] . Besides, the study of 1-convex/1-concave TU games possessing a nonempty core and for which the nucleolus is linear was initiated by Driessen and Tijs [7] and Driessen [5] , but until recently appealing abstract and practical examples of these classes of games were missing. The first practical example of a 1-concave game, the so-called library cost game, and the 1-concave complementary unanimity basis for the entire space of TU games were introduced in Driessen, Khmelnitskaya, and Sales [6] . A co-insurance game under some conditions provides a new practical example of a 1-convex game. Moreover, in this paper we also show that a bankruptcy game is not only convex but 1-convex as well when the estate is sufficiently large comparatively to the given claims.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Basic definitions and notation are given in Sect. 2. Sect. 3 studies the nonemptiness and the structure of the core and the nucleolus of a co-insurance game with respect to the premium value. In Sect. 4 an algorithm for computing the nucleolus is introduced.
Preliminaries
Recall some definitions and notation. A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU game) is a pair N, v , where N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of n ≥ 2 players and v : 2 N → IR is a characteristic function, defined on the power set of N , satisfying v(∅) = 0. A subset S ⊆ N (or S ∈ 2 N ) of s players is called a coalition, and the associated real number v(S) represents the worth of the coalition S; in particular, N is call a grand coalition. The set of all games with a fixed player set N is denoted by G N and it can be naturally identified with the Euclidean space IR 2 n −1 . For simplicity of notation and if no ambiguity appears, we write v instead of N, v when referring to a game. A value is an operator ξ : G N → IR n that assigns to any game v ∈ G N a vector ξ(v) ∈ IR n ; the real number ξ i (v) represents the payoff to the player i in the game v. A payoff vector x ∈ IR n is said to be efficient in the game v, if x(N ) = v(N ). Given a game v, the subgame v| T with the player set T ⊆ N , T = ∅, is a game defined by v|
For the cardinality of a given set A we use a standard notation |A| along with lower case letters like n = |N |, m = |M |, n k = |N k |, and so on. We also use standard notation x(S) = i∈S x i and x S = {x i } i∈S , for all x ∈ IR n , S ⊆ N . The imputation set of a game v ∈ G N is defined as a set of efficient and individually rational payoff vectors
while the preimputation set of a game v ∈ G N is defined as a set of efficient payoff vectors
The core [9] of a game v ∈ G N is defined as a set of efficient payoff vectors that are not dominated by any coalition, i.e.,
For any game v ∈ G N , the excess of a coalition S ⊆ N with respect to a vector x ∈ IR n is given by
The nucleolus [12] is a value defined as a minimizer of the lexicographic ordering of components of the excess vector of a given game v ∈ G N arranged in weakly decreasing order of their magnitude over the imputation set I(v).
The prenucleolus is a value defined as a minimizer of the lexicographic ordering of components of the excess vector of a given game v ∈ G N arranged in weakly decreasing order of their magnitude over the preimputation set I * (v).
For a game v ∈ G N with a nonempty core the nucleolus ν(v) belongs to C(v). For a game v ∈ G N we consider the vector m v ∈ IR n of marginal contributions to the grand coalition, the so-called marginal worth vector, defined as
for all i ∈ N, and the gap vector g v ∈ IR 2 N defined as
i.e., the gap vector measures for every S ⊆ N the total coalitional surplus of marginal contributions to the grand coalition over its worth. In fact, g v (S) = −e v (S, m v ), with e v (S, m v ) being th excess vector of S in game v at payoff vector x = m v . It is easy to check that in any game v ∈ G N , the vector m v relates to the core being an upper bound in that x i ≤ m v i , for any x ∈ C(v) and all i ∈ N . In particular, the condition v(N ) ≤ i∈N m v i is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for nonemptiness of the core of the arbitrary game v, i.e., a strictly negative gap of the grand coalition g v (N ) < 0 implies C(v) = ∅.
A game v ∈ G N is convex if for all i ∈ N and all S ⊆ T ⊆ N \{i},
or equivalently, if for all S, T ⊆ N ,
Any convex game has a nonempty core [13] .
Proposition 1 For every convex game v ∈ G N it holds that
Proof The inequality g v (N ) ≥ 0 follows directly from the nonemptiness of the core of any convex game. Next notice that for any S ⊆ N ,
Therefore, applying successively n − s times the inequality (1), we obtain that for
As it is shown in Driessen and Tijs [7] and Driessen [5] , every 1-convex game has a nonempty core. In a 1-convex game v, for every efficient vector x ∈ IR n , the inequalities x i ≤ m v i , for all i ∈ N , guarantee that x ∈ C(v). In particular, the characterizing property of a 1-convex game is that the replacement of any single coordinate m v i in the vector m v by the amount of
into the core C(v). Moreover, in a 1-convex game the set of vectors {m v (i)} i∈N creates a set of extreme points of the core which in turn coincides with their convex hull, i.e., C(v) = co({m v (i)} i∈N ). Besides, the nucleolus ν(v) occupies the central position in the core coinciding with the barycenter of the core vertices, and is given by the formula
So, the nucleolus coincides with the equal allocation of nonseparable contribution the amount of g v (N ) over the players, or in other terms, every player according to nucleolus gets its marginal contribution to the grand coalition minus an equal share in the gap g v (N ) of the grand coalition. That presents a special advantage of the class of 1-convex games because the nucleolus, defined as a solution to a lexicographical optimization problem that in general is difficult to compute, for 1-convex games appears to be linear and thus simple to determine. By definition of 1-convexity (2) and from Proposition 1 we easily obtain Proposition 2 A convex game v ∈ G N is 1-convex, if and only if
In the next section we study the so-called co-insurance game that appears to be closely related to the well-known bankruptcy game. For a bankruptcy problem (E; d) given by an estate E ∈ IR + and a vector of claims d ∈ IR n + assuming that the total claim of the creditors is greater than the remaining estate, i.e., d(N ) = i∈N d i > E, the corresponding bankruptcy game v E;d ∈ G N is defined in Aumann and Maschler [2] by
To conclude this section recall a few extra definitions that will be used below. A set of coalitions B ⊂ 2 N \{N } is called a set of balanced coalitions, if positive numbers λ S , S ∈ B exist such that
A player i is a veto-player in the game v ∈ G N , if v(S) = 0, for every S ⊆ N \ i. A game v ∈ G N is a veto-rich game if it has at least one veto-player.
For a game v ∈ G N , a coalition S ⊆ N , S = ∅, and an efficient payoff vector x ∈ IR n , the Davis-Maschler reduced game with respect to S and x is the game v S,x ∈ G S defined in [3] by
otherwise, for all T ⊆ S.
3 Co-insurance game and its core
Consider the problem in which a risk is evaluated too much heavy for a single insurance company, but it can be insured by the finite set N of companies that share a given risk R and premium Π. First, it is assumed that every company i ∈ N expresses the valuation of a random variable R through a real-valued nonnegative functional H i (R) such that H i (0) = 0, for all i ∈ N . For any nonempty subset S ⊆ N of companies, let A(S) = {X ∈ IR S | i∈S X i = R} represents the (non-empty) set of feasible decompositions of the given risk R. Second, by hypothesis, it is supposed, for every S ⊆ N , S = ∅,, that an optimal decomposition of the risk exists, so that min X∈A(S) i∈S H i (X i ) := P(S) is well-defined. Here the real-valued set function P can be seen as the evaluation of the optimal decomposition of the risk R by the companies in coalition S as a whole.
To determine the evaluation function P may result in general not an easy task. However, under some reasonable assumptions borrowed from real-life applications it turns out that P can be easily computed for all coalitions. For instance, in case of constant quotas, when it is supposed that for each insurable risk R, for every S ⊆ N , S = ∅, there exists the only one feasible decomposition
specified by a priori given quotas q i > 0, i ∈ N, i∈N q i = 1, and moreover, for each insurable risk R,
where H is some a priori fixed convex function, the evaluation function P for every S ⊆ N , S = ∅, is given by
If insurance companies evaluate a risk R according to the variance principle, i.e.,
where E(R) and V ar(R) denote the expectation and variance of a random variable R, then we are in case of constant quotas when the corresponding quotas may be obtained as
(cf. Deprez and Gerber [4] , Fragnelli and Marina [8] ). Later on we do not discuss the construction of the evaluation function P. The only important in what follows is that P is nonnegative and non-increasing, i.e., for all
For a given premium Π and an evaluation function P : 2 N → IR, Fragnelli and Marina [8] define the associated co-insurance game v Π,P ∈ G N as following
By definition, the co-insurance game v Π,P is nonnegative and since P is non-increasing it easily follows that v is monotonic, i.e., for all
Notice that the well-known bankruptcy game (4) presents an example of the co-insurance game (5). Indeed, if for each insurance company i ∈ N there exists a fixed "claim" d i ≥ 0 such that P(S) = i∈N \S d i , for all S ⊆ N , S = ∅, then the co-insurance game reduces to the bankruptcy game with the estate equal to the premium Π. This particular evaluation function P is nonnegative and nonincreasing, P(N ) = 0.
In the framework of the co-insurance game, we consider the evaluation function P being fixed, while the premium Π as a variable quantity varying from small up to sufficiently large amounts. In order to avoid trivial situations, let the premium Π be large enough so that Π > P(N ). The following results are already proved in [8] :
• If the premium Π is small enough in that Π ≤ max i∈N P(N \{i}), then the coinsurance game v Π,P is balanced since the core C(v Π,P ) contains the efficient allocation ξ = {ξ i } i∈N , where ξ i * = v Π,P (N ) for some i * ∈ arg max i∈N P(N \{i}), and ξ i = 0 for all i = i * .
•
• For all Π ≤ᾱ P , under the hypothesis of reduced concavity of function P:
To ensure strictly positive worth v Π,P (S) > 0 for every coalition S ⊆ N , S = ∅, we suppose that the premium Π is strictly bounded from below by the critical number α P = max i∈N P({i}). For all Π ≥ α P , we have
for any S ⊆ N , S = ∅,
In what follows we distinguish the two casesᾱ P ≥ α P andᾱ P < α P . Notice that in the bankruptcy setting,ᾱ P = i∈N d i and α P = i∈N d i − min i∈N d i , i.e., it always holds that α P ≤ᾱ P .
First consider the caseᾱ P ≥ α P . It turns out that in this case the nonemptiness of the core C(v Π,P ) for Π =ᾱ P is equivalent to 1-convexity of the co-insurance game vᾱ P ,P .
Theorem 1 Letᾱ P ≥ α P , then the following equivalences hold:
(i) the co-insurance game vᾱ P ,P is balanced;
(ii) the core C(vᾱ P ,P ) is a singleton and coincides with the marginal worth vector m vᾱ P ,P ;
(iii) the evaluation function P meets the so-called 1-concavity condition
(iv) the co-insurance game vᾱ P ,P is 1-convex.
Proof From (8) it follows that for all Π ≥ α P ,
By hypothesisᾱ P ≥ α P , therefore, applying the last equality to Π =ᾱ P , we obtain that
Since for any game v ∈ G N , the marginal worth vector m v provides upper bound for the core, a game v with zero gap g v (N ) = 0 can possess at most one core allocation coinciding with m v , which is m vᾱ P ,P in case of the co-insurance game vᾱ P ,P . Next notice that the 1-concavity condition (9) is equivalent to i∈S P(N \{i})−P(N ) ≥ i∈N P(N \{i})−P(N ) +P(N )−P(S), for all S ⊆ N, S = ∅, (11) which is the same as the marginal worth vector m vᾱ P ,P satisfies the core constraints
Whence it follows that the marginal worth vector m vᾱ P ,P ∈ C(vᾱ P ,P ), if and only if the evaluation function P satisfies the 1-concavity condition (9) . Moreover, because of (8), the inequality (11) is equivalent to
which together with equality (10) is equivalent to 1-convexity of the co-insurance game vᾱ P ,P .
Remark 1 Notice that our 1-concavity condition (9) is weaker then the condition of reduced concavity (6) used in [8] .
Theorem 2 If for some fixed premium Π * ≥ α P , the co-insurance game v Π * ,P is 1-convex, then for every premium Π, α P ≤ Π ≤ Π * , the corresponding co-insurance game v Π,P is 1-convex as well.
Proof For all Π ≥ α P , due to (8) it holds that for every S ⊆ N , S = ∅, the gap g v Π,P (S) is a decreasing linear function of the variable Π, while the difference
is constant for all Π. Whence, it follows that if for some fixed premium Π * ≥ α P the co-insurance game v Π * ,P is 1-convex, i.e., for all S ⊆ N , S = ∅, the inequality (2) holds, then this inequality remains valid for all premium α P ≤ Π ≤ Π * , i.e., all games v Π,P appear to be 1-convex as well.
The next theorem follows easily from Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.
Theorem 3 Letᾱ P ≥ α P . If the evaluation function P satisfies the 1-concavity condition (9), then for any premium α P ≤ Π ≤ᾱ P , (i) the corresponding co-insurance game v Π,P is 1-convex;
(ii) the core C(v Π,P ) = ∅;
(iii) the nucleolus ν(v Π,P ) is the barycenter of the core C(v Π,P ) and is given by
Proof The first statement follows directly from Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. Next, recall already mentioned above results obtained in Driessen and Tijs [7] and Driessen [5] , stating that every 1-convex game has a nonempty core and its nucleolus being the barycenter of the core is given by the formula (3). These facts, together with (7) and (8), complete the proof.
In words, the third statement of Theorem 3 means that the nucleolus of these co-insurance games is a linear function of the variable premium such that each incremental premium is shared equally among the insurance companies. Geometrically, the nucleoli payoffs follow a straight line to end up at the marginal worth vector yielding payoff P(N \{i}) − P(N ) to player i ∈ N .
Remark 2 The statement of Theorem 3 remains in force if the 1-concavity condition (9) for the evaluation function P is replaced by any one of the equivalent conditions given by Theorem 1, in particular if C(vᾱ P ,P ) = ∅ or if the co-insurance game vᾱ P ,P is 1-convex.
Remark 3 Formula (12) for nucleolus of a co-insurance game can be derived alternatively using the method for computing the nucleolus of the so-called compromise stable game introduced in Quant et al. [11] . Indeed, it is not difficult to check that every 1-convex game appears to be compromise stable.
Remark 4
In the bankruptcy setting Theorem 3 expresses the fact that the nucleolus provides equal losses to all creditors (insurance companies) with respect to their individual claims, if estate (premium) varies between i∈N d i − min i∈N d i and i∈N d i , which agrees well with the Talmud rule for bankruptcy situations studied exhaustively in Aumann and Maschler [2] .
Consider now the caseᾱ P < α P . In this case, even if the co-insurance game vᾱ P ,P is 1-convex, for the co-insurance game v Π,P corresponding to the premium Π <ᾱ P the 1-convexity may be lost immediately while lowering the premium. This happens due to the fact that the co-insurance worth of at least one coalition turns out to be at zero level. For instance, consider the following example.
Example 1 Let the evaluation function P for 3 insurance companies be given by P({1}) = 5, P({2}) = 4, P({3}) = 3, P({1, 2}) = P({1, 3}) = P({2, 3}) = 2, and P({1, 2, 3}) = 1. In this case, 4 =ᾱ P < α P = 5.
• If the premium Π = 4, then the co-insurance game v 4,P :
is a 1-convex game with the minimal for a 1-convex game gap g v 4,P ({123}) = 0 and, therefore, with the unique core allocation m v 4,P = (1, 1, 1).
• If the premium Π = 3, then the co-insurance game v 3,P :
is a symmetric 1-convex and convex, since the gap g v 3,P (S) = 1 is constant for all S ⊆ N , S = ∅, while its core C(v 3,P ) is the triangle with three extreme points (1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1 ).
• For any premium 2 ≤ Π < 3, the corresponding co-insurance game v Π,P is zeronormalized and symmetric: v Π,P (i) = 0, v Π,P (ij) = Π − 2, v Π,P (123) = Π − 1.
However, the 1-convexity fails because the gap of singletons is strictly less than the gap of N : g v Π,P (i) = 1 < 4 − Π = g v Π,P (123).
Algorithms for computing nucleolus
It is easy to compute the nucleolus of a co-insurance game when it is a linear function of a given premium as it is stated by Theorem 3. In this section we introduce a comparatively simple algorithm that allows to compute the nucleolus of a co-insurance game also in cases when it is nonlinear in the premium. To do that, we uncover first the relation between the class of co-insurance games, in particular bankruptcy games, and the class Davis-Maschler reduced games of monotonic vetorich games obtained by deleting a veto-player with respect to the nucleolus. Second, we provide an algorithm for computing the nucleolus for games of the latter class.
In what follows by G m N we denote the class of all monotonic games with a player set N . Let N 0 := N ∪ {0} and n 0 = n + 1. Consider the class G m 
For every veto-rich game v 0 ∈ G + N 0 let ν 0 denote the nucleolus payoff ν 0 (v 0 ) to the veto-player 0 in v 0 . Besides, for a game v ∈ G N and a ∈ IR + we define the game v −a ∈ G N as follows
Below for the facilitation of reading for any set of players M containing the vetoplayer 0, any coalition S 0 ⊆ M with subindex 0 is assumed to contain the veto-player 0, and it is supposed that for any S 0 ⊆ M holds the equality s 0 = |S 0 | = s+1, where s = |S 0 ∩ M \{0}|. Furthermore, for any game w ∈ G M , for every S M we define a number
For M ∋ 0, we define also a number κ * (w) = min S M κ w (S), and for M ∋ 0, we define a number κ * 0 (w) = min
Theorem 4 It holds that
(i) every game v ∈ R N can be presented in the form of a co-insurance game v Π,P ∈ G N ;
(ii) if v Π * ,P ∈ R N , then for every premium Π ≤ Π * , v Π,P ∈ R N as well;
(iii) for every evaluation function P : 2 N → IR, for every premium Π,
the co-insurance game v Π,P ∈ R N . (ii). Recall first that every co-insurance game is monotonic and, moreover, for any co-insurance game v Π,P , for any a ∈ IR + , the game v −a Π,P is also a co-insurance game with the premium equal to Π − a, i.e, v −a Π,P = v Π−a,P . Therefore in view of (i) proved above, for proving (ii) it is sufficient to show that if for certain game v ∈ G m N it holds that v −a ∈ R N for some a ∈ IR + , then v −b ∈ R N for all b ∈ IR + , a < b. Moreover, notice that it is enough to prove that v −b ∈ R N only for a < b ≤ v(N ) since due to (14) , it holds
Consider now a game v ∈ G m N together with its associated veto-rich game v 0 ∈ G m N 0
. From (13) and already mentioned above statement of Arin and Feltkamp [1] concerning the nucleolus payoff to a veto-player, it follows easily that 
Next, we show that if a < v(N ), then for all b, a ≤ b ≤ v(N ), also v −b ∈ R N . The above procedure of constructing a veto-removed game may be applied to any monotonic game, in particular to the just obtained monotonic game v −a ∈ R N . Doing that, we get another monotonic game, say v −a 1 ∈ R N , with a 1 = a+ν 0 (v −a ) > a when a < v(N ). We show first that v −b ∈ R N for all a ≤ b ≤ a 1 . Consider 0 ≤ c ≤ a and apply the above procedure for all monotonic games v −c ∈ G N . For c = 0 we start with v and obtain the monotonic game v −a ∈ R N . For c = a we start with v −a and obtain the monotonic game v −a 1 ∈ R N . Due to the continuity of the nucleolus we obtain all v −b while c varies between 0 and a.
When a 1 < v(N ) then applying the above procedure to the game v −a 1 we obtain a game v −a 2 ∈ R N with a 2 > a 1 and so on. Since on each step k,
, any number a ≤ b ≤ v(N ) can be reached by not more than
. Take a co-insurance game v Π,P with Π ≥ α P , for simplicity of notation denote v Π,P by v, and consider the corresponding veto-rich game v 0 ∈ G m N 0 defined by (13) . As it is shown in the proof of (ii), the Davis-Maschler reduced game of the game v 0 obtained by deleting the veto-player 0 with respect to the nucleolus coincides with the game v −a , a = ν 0 , which in turn coincides with the co-insurance game v Π ′ ,P with Π ′ = Π − ν 0 . Hence, v Π ′ ,P ∈ R N . From Proposition 3 below and the definition of a co-insurance game (5), since Π ≥ α P , it follows that
i.e.,
Then the validity of (iii) follows immediately from the just proved (ii).
Notice that (16) provides rather rough estimation of Π * . In fact, in the particular case of bankruptcy games, (16) guarantees that v E;d ∈ R N only when E ≤ 0. Next theorem imposes weaker conditions on the parameters of a bankruptcy game v E;d to guarantee that v E;d ∈ R N .
Theorem 5 For any estate E ∈ IR + and any vector of claims
Proof First take a bankruptcy game v E;d with E = i∈N d i and let v be its coinsurance game representation, i.e., v = v Π,P with Π = d(N ) and
For a co-insurance game v consider the corresponding veto-rich game v 0 defined by (13) ,
We compute now the nucleolus payoff ν 0 to the veto player 0 in v 0 applying Algorithm 2 yielding nucleolus for monotonic veto-rich games with a veto-player 0 introduced below. Without loss of generality we assume that
Moreover, for every k = 1, . . . , n we define a veto-rich game v k on N 0 \{1, . . . , k} as follows
For any coalition S 0 N 0 it holds that
Whence it follows that κ * 0 (v 0 ) = κ v 0 (N 0 \{1}), and therefore, Step 1 of Algorithm 2 assigns the nucleolus payoff ν 1 (v 0 ) = and coincides with the game v 1 . Using the similar reasoning it is not difficult to see that for any k = 2, . . . , n, Algorithm 2 applied to the veto-rich game v k−1 defined on the player set N 0 \{1, . . . , k − 1} assigns the nucleolus payoff d k 2 to the player k and goes to the next step with the Davis-Maschler reduced game coinciding with the game v k defined on the player set N 0 \{1, . . . , k}. Then applying the induction argument we obtain that ν i (v 0 ) =
Next observe that if a co-insurance game v Π,P represents a bankruptcy game v E;d , then for any a ∈ IR + , the co-insurance game v −a Π,P represents the bankruptcy game v E−a;d . Hence, we may complete the proof following the same arguments as in the proof of the statement (ii) of Theorem 4.
Consider now the following algorithm for constructing a payoff vector, say x ∈ IR N , in a game v ∈ R N .
Algorithm 1
0. Set M = N and w = v.
1. Find a coalition S M with minimal size such that κ w (S) = κ * (w).
2. For i ∈ M \S, set x i = κ w (S). If S = ∅, then stop, otherwise go to Step 3.
3. Construct the Davis-Maschler reduced game w S,x ∈ G S . Set M = S and w = w S,x and return to Step 1.
Theorem 6
For any veto-removed game v ∈ R N , Algorithm 1 yields the nucleolus payoff, i.e., x = ν(v).
The proof of Theorem 6 is obtained by comparing the outputs of two algorithms yielding nucleoli -Algorithm 1 applied to a veto-removed game v ∈ R N and another Algorithm 2, applied to the associated monotonic veto-rich game v 0 ∈ G m N 0 . Algorithm 2 is closed conceptually to the algorithm for computing the nucleolus for veto-rich games suggested in Arin and Feltkamp [1] . It is worth noting that for the application of Algorithm 1 to a veto-removed game v ∈ R N there is no need in construction of the associated monotonic veto-rich game v 0 ∈ G m N 0 which is only necessary for proving Theorem 6. The proof of Theorem 6 is given after the proof of Theorem 7.
The following Algorithm 2 constructs a payoff vector, say y ∈ IR N 0 , in a game
, Algorithm 2 is applicable to any game v 0 ∈ G m N 0 as well.
Algorithm 2
0. Set M = N 0 and w = v 0 .
1. Find a coalition S 0 M with minimal size such that κ w (S 0 ) = κ * 0 (w).
For
stop, otherwise go to Step 3.
3. Construct the Davis-Maschler reduced game w S 0 ,y ∈ G S 0 . Set M = S 0 and w = w S 0 ,y and return to Step 1.
Theorem 7 For any veto-rich game
, Algorithm 2 yields the nucleolus payoff, i.e., y = ν(v 0 ).
. For the simplification of notation denote the nucleolus ν(v 0 ) by x, x ∈ IR n+1 , and let e * (v 0 ) denote the maximal excess with respect to the nucleolus in the game v 0 , i.e., e * (v 0 ) = max S N 0 e v 0 (S, x). As a corollary to the Kohlberg's characterization of the prenucleolus [10] it holds that the collection of coalitions with maximal excess values with respect to the nucleolus is balanced. Due to the balancedness, among the coalitions having the maximal excess there exists S 0 N 0 . We show that every singleton {i}, i / ∈ S 0 , also has the maximal excess. Let i / ∈ S 0 . Again due to the balancedness, there exists S ⊂ N 0 , S ∋ i, S ∋ 0, with maximal excess. Observe that since S ∋ 0, then by definition of a veto-rich game
Since the core of every veto-rich game in G N 0 + is nonempty, the nucleolus belongs to the core and all excesses with respect to the nucleolus are nonpositive, in particular, e(S\{i}, x) ≤ 0. From where it follows that e({i}, x) ≥ e(S, x), i.e., every singleton {i}, i / ∈ S, possesses the maximal excess as well. For every S 0 N 0 with maximal excess with respect to the nucleolus from the efficiency of the nucleolus and the equality v 0 ({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N 0 \S 0 , it follows that
Moreover, for every T 0 N 0 it holds that
Whence, for every T 0 N 0
while for S 0 N 0 with maximal excess with respect to the nucleolus holds the equality κ v 0 (S 0 ) = −e * (v 0 ). Then it follows that S 0 N 0 has the maximal excess with respect to the nucleolus if and only if κ v 0 (S 0 ) = κ * 0 (v 0 ). Therefore, on the first iteration of Algorithm 2 when M = N 0 and w = v 0 , Step 1 provides a coalition S 0 N 0 with maximal excess with respect to the nucleolus. Then Step 2 assigns to every i ∈ N 0 \S 0 its nucleolus payoff because the assigned payoff y i = κ v 0 (S 0 ) coincides with x i = ν i (v 0 ) since
In every veto-rich game from the class G + M with M containing the veto-player 0 the nucleolus coincides with the prenucleolus due to the nonemptiness of the core which was already mentioned above with reference to [1] . Then, because of the Davis-Maschler consistency of the prenucleolus [14] , the nucleolus payoffs to the players in the Davis-Maschler reduced game w S 0 ,y ∈ G S 0 constructed in Step 3 of Algorithm 2 are the same as the nucleolus payoffs to the players in S 0 in the game w ∈ G + M . Thus in order to complete the proof, it only remains to show that the Davis-Maschler reduced game w S 0 ,y ∈ G S 0 of a game w ∈ G M + with M containing the veto-player 0 is itself a veto-rich game belonging to G
Thus, 0 is a veto-player in w S 0 ,y ∈ G S 0 as well. Further, it is evident that w S 0 ,y is nonnegative. Hence, it remains to show that w S 0 ,y (S 0 ) ≥ w S 0 ,y (T ) for every
Moreover, T 0 ∪ Q ⊆ M and T 0 ∪ Q ∋ 0. By Step 1 of Algorithm 2, κ w (S 0 ) is the minimal among all coalitions in M containing the veto-player 0. From where and also because of the obvious inequality s 0 > t 0 −1, it holds that
and therefore, since at Step 2 every player's i ∈ M \S 0 payoff y i = κ w (S 0 ), it holds that
Then by definition of the Davis-Maschler reduced game we obtain w S 0 ,y (S 0 ) ≥ w S 0 ,y (T 0 ) for every T 0 ⊆ S 0 .
From the proof of Theorem 7 also the upper bound for the nucleolus payoff ν 0 to the veto-player 0 in a veto-rich game v 0 ∈ G + N 0 easily follows.
Proposition 3 For any veto-rich game
with the equality, if and only if ν i (v 0 ) = ν j (v 0 ) holds for all i, j ∈ N .
Proof Since v 0 (i) = 0 for all i ∈ N , every excess of a singleton coalition {i}, i = 0, with respect to the nucleolus ν(v 0 ) is equal to −ν i (v 0 ). From (17) in the proof of Theorem 7 it follows that the maximal excess in v 0 with respect to the nucleolus is equal to −κ * 0 (v 0 ). Therefore from the efficiency of the nucleolus we obtain that
where the equality hold, if and only if ν i (v 0 ) = κ * 0 (v 0 ) for all i, j ∈ N .
Remark 5
The inequality (18) can be equivalently presented in the form
with the equality, if and only if ν i (v 0 ) = ν j (v 0 ) holds for all i, j ∈ N . Inequality (19) will be used later in the proof of Theorem 6.
We are ready now to prove Theorem 6. 
i.e., κ v (∅) ≤ κ v (S) while |∅| = 0 < s, which contradicts the choice of S. Let now S 0 N 0 be the coalition chosen in Step 1 at the first iteration of Algorithm 2 and let S = S 0 \{0}. Similarly to the paragraph above, it turns out that either S = ∅, or v(S) = v 0 (S ∪ {0}) − y 0 . Indeed if S = ∅ and v(S) = max{0, v 0 (S ∪ {0}) − y 0 } = 0, i.e., v 0 (S ∪ {0}) − y 0 < 0, then
which contradicts Proposition 3 restated in the form (19). Thus, for the coalition S 0 chosen in Step 1 at the first iteration of Algorithm 2 it holds that either S = S 0 \{0} = ∅, or v(S) = v 0 (S ∪ {0}) − y 0 .
Hence, due to the Davis-Maschler reduced game relationship between v and v 0 , in both algorithms for all S N with the assumption that S = S 0 \{0} for S 0 chosen in Step 1 of Algorithm 2, it holds that either S = ∅ or v(S) = v 0 (S ∪ {0}) − y 0 . Thus, for proving (20) it is sufficient to prove that for all S N it holds that κ v (S) = κ v 0 (S ∪ {0}). If κ v (∅) > κ v (S), then there exists S ′ N , S ′ = ∅, such that κ v (S ′ ) = κ * (v) (possibly, S ′ = S). Hence, due to (21), for S ′ 0 = S ′ ∪ {0} N 0 , κ v (S ′ ) = κ v 0 (S ′ 0 ), i.e., in this case κ * (v) = κ * 0 (v 0 ) as well. Thus, it is proved that either in Step 1 of Algorithm 1 either S = ∅ is chosen and the algorithm yields the nucleolus, or κ * (v) = κ * 0 (v 0 ). For completing the proof it remains to consider the situation when in Step 1 of Algorithm 1 a coalition S N , S = ∅, is chosen. As it is shown above in such a case in Step 1 of Algorithm 2 we always can chose S 0 N 0 , S 0 = S ∪ {0}, for which κ v 0 (S 0 ) = κ v (S). Thus, at the first iteration both algorithms at Step 2 assign x i = y i for every i ∈ N \S = N 0 \S 0 . It is easy to see that the Davis-Maschler reduced game w S,x constructed in Step 3 of Algorithm 1 is the Davis-Maschler reduced game of the Davis-Maschler reduced game w S 0 ,y constructed in Step 3 of Algorithm 2. Then observe that the situation at all next iterations of both algorithms remains the same. Therefore, repeating the same reasoning as above we obtain that both algorithms assign the same payoffs to all players in N .
